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STOCKHOLDER UNANIMITY IN MAKING
PRODUCTION AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS*
SANFORD J . GROSSMAN AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
We show that "spanning" does not imply stockholder unanimity if there is trading
in the shares of firms. Each basis vector of the space spanned by all firms' output vectors
tan he treated like a composite commodity. If, in addition to apannin^, firms act as price
takers with respect tu prices of composite commodities, then there is unanimity. We
analyze the spanning assumption for the vector space of contingent claims generated
hy firms' choices of debt-equity ratios. We show that there is a strong relationship
hetween the Modigliani-Miller theorem, spanning, and the existence of a complete
set of markets.
INTRODUCTION
The recent literature on corporate firm behavior has developed
conditions under which all stockholders of a firm will unanimously
prefer a given production decision over some others. Under the as-
sumption of no trade, stockholder unanimity is proved, provided that
any production plan of the firm can he written as a linear comhination
of the production plans of the other firms, i.e., there is "spanning."
This theorem is thought of as an extension of the well-known result
that if there is a complete set of state-contingent claims markets, then
there is shareholder unanimity.
This paper shows that spanning does not, in general, imply
unanimity if there is trading in the shares of firms. We study a model
where consumers trade shares after receiving new information about
the firm's output hetween the time of a production decision and the
time the output comes out of its machines. We consider the vector
space spanned hy the output vectors of all firms and choose a basis
for the vector space. Each basis vector can be treated in the same way
that a composite commodity is treated in consumption theory.
Though spanning does not imply unanimity when there is trade due
to new information, we give a condition that does imply unanimity.
If, in addition to spanning, firms are assumed to behave as perfect
competitors in the production of the comp(isite commodities that form
a basis for the spanned space, then there is unanimity. We call this
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assumption "competitivity." This is the assumption that each firm
perceives the market price of the basis (i.e., composite) commodities
to be unaffected by its production decision. However, the assumption
of both spanning and competitivity leads to the very strong result that
all of a iirm's shareholders desire to maximize the net market value
of their shares. Though this may be a satisfactory theory, we refer to
empirical evidence for a particular class of firms that do not value
maximize.
Spanning has a further extreme implication when one of the
firm's decision variables is its debt-equity ratio. We show that if
spanning holds with respect to this decision variahle, then there must
be a complete set of contingent claims markets, and thus the spanning
theorem is no generalization of the well-known result that with
complete markets the debt-equity ratio is indeterminate. In addition,
we show that there is a strong relationship between the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem, spanning, and the existence of a complete set of
markets.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes our
three-period economy {where there are two trading periods to allow
for the analysis of the effect of trade due to new information). Section
III surveys the literature on spanning in models with one trading
period in order to point out how the no-trade assumption is used and
how competivity can be used to avoid this assumption. Section IV
shows that spanning alone does not imply unanimity in a multiperiod
context, but that spanning plus competitivity does imply unanimity.
Section V discusses unanimity with respect to the choice of the
debt-equity ratio, and shows that if the return stream of any bond
issued by any firm can be written as a linear combination of the re-
turns of existing firms (i.e., spanning with respect to debt as well as
equity), then there must be a complete set of contingent claims
markets. Section VI gives conclusions and refers to empirical evidence
on value maximization.
II. T H E MULTIPERIOD MODEL WITHOUT DEBT
The economy extends for three periods 0, 1, 2. The state of the
world UJ is composed of a signal t, which is known in period 1 and a
final state .s, which is known in period 2; w = (t, s). There is a single
commodity that is available in each period and that is used for con-
sumption and investment in period 0. There is no investment in pe-
riods 1 and 2; only consumption occurs in those periods.
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In period 0, there are markets for the single current commodity
and also for shares in firms. It is assumed that no contingent com-
modity contracts can be made. In period 1, there are markets for the
single current commodity and also for shares in the firms. Consumers
also get the signal t which changes their beliefs about s, before trading
in period 1. In period 2, consumers are allocated output according to
the shares held in firms at the end of period L
Let there be / consumers, J firms, 7' signals, and S final states,
indexed by i = 1 , . . . , / . 7 = 1,. . . , J, ( = 1, T, s = 1 , . . . , S, re-
spectively. Sometimes /, J, T, S will be referred to as the set of con-
sumers, firms, signals, and final states, respectively.
Consumers
We shall represent consumer i's consumption plan by a vector
Xi = {xf, x}, xf) € /ii"*''^ "*'^ ,^ where xf e R+ is consumption in period
0; xjit) € R+ is consumption when there is signal t in period \;xf{a))
= xf{t, s) e R+ is consumption in period 2 when {t, s) was realized.
Consumer i is assumed to have a utility function (7, defined on
f^u-T-t-rs We shall assume that f/, is strictly quasi-concave and con-
tinuously differentiable on the interior of its domain, and dUi {xi)/dxf
— - as xf -- 0, d U i i x i ) / d x l { t ) ^ <-> as x } i t ) ^ 0 (OT t = 1 , 2 , . . . ,
T.
F i r m s
Firmy's production possibilities are represented by a production
set V,- c Rl^y \fyj e Yj, we write >•> = (y)'.v^^), where y^ e R+ is the
input in period 0 and yf(s) e R+ is the output in period 2 state s. Note
that inputs appear as nonnegative numhers. We shall assume that Yj
is convex, closed, and contains the origin. Further, if y^  e Yj and yj
= 0, then yJ = 0.
It is assumed that consumer i has initial endowments xf e R+,
x} e Rl of the commodity in periods 0 and 1, respectively. He also
has initial shareholdings, 0,j > 0 in firm ;, where J^iOjj = 1 for each
y^For notational simplicity w^ignore endowments in period 2. Let
^° = ILixf, and assume that X" > 0.
Equilibrium for Fixed Production Plans
Let yj be given for each; = 1, . . . ,J . The ith consumer maximizes
Uiixf, xj, xf) with respect to {xi, 6^, dij{t)),j = I, J,t=l,...,
T subject to
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(2) xlit) + EPJ<0^ I7 (0 ^ ilPjU^f^ij + xjit)
J J
j J
where xfis, t) is the is, 0th component of xf and represents i's
planned consumption at date 2 if t is the date 1 signal and .s is the date
2 state; Oijit) is the planned holdings of shares of firm ;" in period 1
when t is the information signal;x}{t) is the tth component of xl;pj{t)
is the price of firm ; in period 1, signal f; Pj is the price of firm ; in
period 0; and (hj is the desired holdings of shares of firm ; in period
0. In (3) we have assumed that inputs Vy are financed by the issuance
of equity alone, so that pj - yj is the net market value of firm ; to the
initial shareholders. In (l)-(3) we assume that shares of firms provide
the only means of purchasing state-contingent income.
With no constraint against short sales (i.e., we do not require 0^
or Oijit) to be nonnegative), necessary and sufficient conditions for
a solution to the maximum problem are that there exist multipliers
(Xl\ X]), Xf € R^, XI € Rl such t ha t






and Xii is the t th component of X •.
A competitive exchange equilibrium for the economy, relative
to the production plans (yj), is then a collection (x,), (9y), iOij{t)), (pj),
(p,(0) such that (4)^(6) hold for each consumer and
T.dij{t) = I, ^ t e T. V i e J
i
and
/ . X; \l ) — / .X, \L ) , V t f c - I -
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In the above economy, firms fix their inputs in period 0, and
output is realized in period 2. In period 1 consumers get tiew infor-
mation about the distribution of firm output in period 2, so tbey have
the opportunity to recontract away from their period zero holdings
of firm shares. In period 2, state ,s, eacb consumer gets the output that
corresponds to the share of tbe firms he owns.
In the above definition of equilibrium we took as exogenously
given the production plans of all firms. We now exposit some methods
of determining production plans as well as exchange equilibrium. We
assume that the initial shareholders of a firm have the power to make
a legally binding contract for it.s input and output decisions (see
Grossman and Hart [1979] for an elaboration of the importance of
this assumption). For example, the initial shareholders can legally
bind the firm to purchase a particular piece of land. We assume that
future shareholders cannot alter tbis purchase (i.e., they cannot renege
on the firm's contracts). Thus, we search for a production plan y' such
that no initial shareholder prefers some otber plan yj to y]. In this
section we shall give a local analysis of eacb shareholder's problem;
in later sections a global analysis is presented. In order to find a locally
optimum decision, we derive an initial shareholder's change in utility
if the production plan is changed in the direction of an arbitrary yj
e Y/. That is, for 0 ^ c ^ l ,yj(c)-(l -c)y] + cyj is in V;. Note that
y|(c) is tbe vector of date 2 contingent claims. It should not be con-
fused with >'J(.s), which is output in states at date 2. Define t/'(c) as
the maximal value of U;{x^, xj, xf) with respect to {xi, 0^, Bijit))




In deriving equation (8), we have used equations {4)-(6) and the as-
sumption,^
(y) —— = —— = 0 for A ?^  /.
dc dc
1. Note that there are no terms in (8) for di9,y or dO,j ((). Direct computation will
verify that all such terms drop out. This is a version of the Envelope Theorem: changes
in an endogenous variable caused by a change in a parameter cannot increase the
magnitude of an objective functitin, if the endogenous variables are set ()ptimally. Note
that we are assuming that the consumers' optimal choice of (x,, d,jit). 6^) is a differ-
entiable function of c.
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Tbat is, when the ;tb firm changes its production decision, no change
is assumed to occur in all other firms' production decisions and prices.
(Here we are already making assumptions about tbe degree of com-
petition among firms, or implicitly imposing a Nash equilibrium no-
tion on firm behavior.) Note tbat price cbanges enter equation (8).
Tbe interpretation of equation (8) is tbat it represents a sbarebolder's
perceptions about bis change in utility as a function of perceived price
cbanges. These contemplated changes are caused by a contemplated
change in production plan.'^  We shall explain tbe meaning of eacb of
the terms in (8), below.
Much of the recent literature on firm behavior bas attempted
to show tbat (8) has the same sign for all individuals, i.e., tbat there
is unanimity with respect to different individual evaluations of al-
ternative production plans. It is our objective to show that the as-
sumption of "spanning," which is made to get unanimity in a two-
period context, is not sufficient in a three-period context. We shall
show that in addition to spanning, the stronger assumption of com-
petitivity (to be defined below) is a sufficient condition for unanimity
in a multiperiod trading context. It will be useful first, to review the
literature on unanimity in a two-period context (i.e., one trading
period).''
III. UNANIMITY WITH ONLY ONE TRADING PERIOD
Suppose that we close the market for shares in period 1, or that
witb the market open, all traders decide not to trade. In this case the
firm makes its decision in period 0, and in period 2 consumers get their
period 0 shares of tbe firm's period 2 output. That is, 6ik = Oikit) for
all t, so equation (8) can be written as
dc
Tbe first term on the rigbt-hand side of (10) represents a wealth
(i.e., capital gains) effect, while the second term represents a con-
sumption effect (i.e., tbe cbange in utility due to a cbange in the
2. The next two sections will be much more specific about how a firm should
perceive the price of its shares to change when it changes its production plan.
3. See Ekern 11973] for some results on multiperiod spanning that are of the same
type as the Ekern-Wilson result.s described in Section III.
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composition of date 2 consumption). Stiglitz [1970] considered two
alternative technological assumptions under which stockholder
unanimity would occur: all traders agree that yf has a given normal
distribution, or alternatively tbere is multiplicative uncertainty
(stochastic homotheticity). Multiplicative uncertainty means that
any yj G YJ can be written as ky'J for some positive real number k.
Thus,
dc
for some real^umber k. An increase in c by dc represents an increase
in output of kdc percent in every state of nature. If tbis is the case,
tben the consumption effect in (10) becomes
(12)
wbere the second equality follows from (5) and (6). It follows from (12)
that all shareholders in firm j agree about the sign of the consumption
effect. However, in order for all shareholders to agree to change c, they
must agree about the sign of the sum of the consumption and tbe
wealth effect; see (10).
In order to get some intuition as to tbe sign of this sum, Stiglitz
argued that two phases of a corporation's existence can be iso-
lated^an early phase and a mature pbase. In the early phase of the
firm, a small group of investors own tbe firm and want to raise capital
to expand, and eacb member wants to diversify bis personal wealth
into other securities. In this early pbase the initial stockholders have
very large Bij (initial holdings) relative to 0,j (desired holdings). Thus,
assuming that f,y ^ 0, we can write (10) as
,13)
dc dc
Clearly in this case all stockholders desire to maximize net market
value.
In the mature, steady state stage of a firm's existence, stock-
holders simply hold their portfolio of shares every period, i.e., in a
world with no new information or otber shocks bitting the market,
a steady state means that Oij = Oij. Using Oij = Oij and (12), we can write
(10) as
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Shareholders will unanimously favor a k percent increase in y) i
> dyf{c)/dc. Otherwise, shareholders will unanimously be opposed
to such a change. Note that this does not imply that shareholders
unanimously favor net market value maximization (i.e., choosing a
production plan to maximize pj - yJ). Equation (14) would imply net
value maximization if the additional (competitivity) assumption is
made that a k percent increase in output in each state leads to a k
percent increase in the price of the firm's shares. That is, the product
this firm is selling to shareholders is a bundle of contingent claims y]'.
If it produces k percent more of tbis commodity, then its revenue will
not go up by k percent, unless tbere is an additional assumption of
price-taking behavior. This is further elaborated below.
Note that we have permitted short sales and assumed that
shareholders are price takers with respect to tbeir trades in the stock
market. It migbt be thougbt that competitivity follows immediately
from tbese assumptions because each shareholder can buy or sell a
claim to the dividend stream (1 + k)yj* by changing bis shareholdings
from Oij to (1 + k)Oij. The cost of doing this would hepjil + k)dij —
PjOij = Oijkpj, for a price-taking shareholder. Thus, a consurner
trading on his own account would face a cost change of dpj/dc = kpj
if he tried to change bis dividends to (1 + k)yj. This is misleading in
that it confuses competition among shareholders for shares of the firm
witb competition among firms in producing the output yj. For ex-
ample, suppose that there is only one state of nature, and y] is the
amount of water a water monopolist sells. Then shareholders are just
the consumers of water. Each water consumer can act like a price
taker, but the water monopolist owns the only water well, and he
realizes that doubling his water sales will lower the price of water.''
Ekern-Wilson [1974] and Leiand [1974] have generalized the
technological conditions under which stockholders are unanimous
with respect to the sign of the consumption effect, and called Stiglitz's
steady state assumption that Oij = dij, "ex post unanimity." Note that
4. Thi.s view is to be contrasted with tbat of Hart [1979] wbo argues that if there
are an infinite number of consumers and a finite amount of water, t.ben each consumer
consunnes an infiniteKimal amount of water and the price of water is the marginal rate
of suhstitution between water and current consumption, evaluated at zerd water con-
sumption. Tbis price will not vary if the firm doubles its water sales because eacb
consumer still consumes an infinitesimal amount of water. In our view each consumer
consumes a small enough proportion of the total water output to act as a price taker;
however, eacb consumer would bave a much bigber marginal rate of substitution if be
had to halve his water consumption. This is because even though any consumer's
consumption is small relative to total production, it is large relative to his needs.
Grossman [1979] analyzes the role of free entry when fixed costs are large in ensuring
price-taking behavior, and provides less stringent conditions for perfect competition
than does Hart.
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in Section II we assumed that initial shareholders made a legally
binding commitment on the firm to produce yj. One interpretation
of "ex post unanimity" is that final shareholders make the production
decision rather than initial shareholders. A final shareholder, by
definition, has no desire to trade so Oij = Oij. However, it is clearly in
the interest of initial shareholders to choose the production decision
that is best for themselves (by definition). Presumably, "ex post
unanimity" applies to firms where legally binding commitments are
difficult to make. As we shall show in a multiperiod model, final
shareholders cannot make the production decision because they do
not own the firm until a time in the future subsequent to actual out-
puts being produced. Ekern and Wilson assume that any feasible
change in a firm's output plan can be written as a linear combination
of all firm's current output plans; witb {y;}/=i given, they assume tbere
exist real numbers Cvjk such tbat
(15)
etc k=i
If (15) holds for \yj\'f=i, we say there is spanning at tyjl/=i. Substituting
(15) into (10) and using (5) and (6) yields
^ _ dyjic) ,dpj
dc I dc(16) ., ^dc
We see tbat tbe sign of the consumption effect is independent of (, for
all shareholders of firm ;. Using the no-trade or ex post condition tbat
^ij - Oii, we bave
(17)
dc
tbe sign of wbich is independent of i for all sbarebolders of firm ;.
Ekern and Wilson concluded that unanimity can occur, but that
it does not imply value maximization, since tbey saw no relationship
between Y.k^'^jkPk and dpj/dc. We shall sbow below that these two
terms are equal if an appropriate form of price-taking bebavior occurs,
whicb we call competitivity. We sball show in tbe next section that
tbe Ekern-Wilson result is a strictly *'one trading period" theorem.
It does not hold if we allow trade in period 1. Spanning only implies
unanimity in an economy where people would not want to trade after
production decisions have been made.
Leland [1973, p. 16] and Radner [1974] give general conditions
under wbich there is unanimity on value maximization, ln doing so,
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tbey assume spanning, but do not impose the no-trade (ex post)
condition Oij = Oij. Instead, tbey assume competitivity as Diamond
11967] assumed. Diamond noted tbat with certain technologies it is
possible to analyze a stock market economy as if it is an ordinary
Arrow-Debreu economy wbere composite commodities are traded.
To study their approach to spanning, it is helpful to consider all
the sets Z/, of the form Z^ = R XL, wbere L isalinearsubspaceof/?-*^',
Let Z be tbe smallest set Z/, containing all tbe production sets Yj,
j = I,. . . ,J, i.e., z 6 Z iff Z/^  D (7/7; implies that 2 € Z/,. Z is clearly
a linear subspace of i?"^ "*"^  and can be written as Z = /? X Z- for some
L, whicb is a linear subspace of Z?-**. Cboose a basis for L, say \ek\k=u
where e^ € fi"^-
We shall now define an Arrow-Debreu economy wbere consumers
purchase quantities of tbe various cbaracteristics [e !^, instead of shares
of the firm. As in the previous part of tbis section, we shall assume only
one trading period for firm shares, period 0. As there is no trade in firm
sbares in period l,x,^ c fl+, ratber than .xr e R'^ ^^  If the ith consumer
chooses an xf e R+, which is technologically feasible (i.e., in L), then
there existK real numbers,/3,fe,/e = 1,. .. , K such that xf= Y.k=4^ikek-
Therefore, we can define an implicit utility function for the ith con-
sumer as
(18) Viixf, xj, i3i) ^ Ui ixf, xj, r. A-fe
wbere |3,fe is the quantity of the ^th cbaracteristic that consumer i
purchases in period 0 for delivery in period 2.
We can define Arrow-Debreu prices tor the characteristics. Let
q e R'^ he tbe price vector for quantities of characteristics. Let qk be
tbe /?tb component of q. The object {\x', fi'\, \y'j, a'\, q*) is an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for characteristics in a one-trading period
model if
(19) xT = Z (^Ikek, xr = xl.
k
and
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and iyj', a*) is a maximizer of (?• aj — y" subject to CyJ", Efc j^A^fe) e
(21) Zxr = Z yf- Exr + Z yf = S xf.
I- j i j i
Condition (19) states tbat consumers maximize utility subject to a
budget constraint where their wealtb is measured by tbeir initial
endowment of goods and their initial sbares of firms' profits. Condi-
tion (20) states tbat firms maximize profits. Firms can calculate profits
bere because they produce characteristics and the market prices
characteristics. Thus, if tbe ;th firm produces an additional unit of
characteristic k (i.e., increase a;;; by one unit), its value increases by
qk- Competitivity means tbat each firm takes the price vector q a.s
given and not affected by its own output decision. If it is the case tbat
the stock market economy is equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu economy
in characteristics, then unanimity in favor of value maximization
would immediately follow. Obviously, in an Arrow-Debreu economy
all shareholders prefer value maximization.
Note that «j e R-^ (see (15)). Further, cxj is the representation
of firm ;'s output (or change in output) in terms of the output vectors
of all otber firms. The assumption of spanning is tbat tbe output
vector of firm ; is in the spanning set generated by tbe output vectors
of all firms. On the other hand, K is the smallest number of vectors
needed to represent the output of any firm. The vector aj represents
firm y's output in terms of a basis vector for the /C-dimensional space
L. ln general, K is much larger than J because there are many more
states of nature than firms. However, Radner's spanning assumption
(below) is that J = K.
Radner says that the above economy has the spanning property
when
(22) \yr\p_,
spans L. It is clear that when the Arrow-Debreu economy for char-
acteristics has the spanning property, it is formally equivalent to the
stock market economy where shares of firms are traded and firms are
valued by
(23) Pj=q- dj.
when their output vector is
yf = E
k
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This is because any vector in L can be acbieved by buying appropriate
shares of
i.e., by buying appropriate sbares of the firms. Suppose that all
shareholders believe that the prices of characteristics are parameters
beyond any firm's control, then
(24) ^ = Q'^
dc dc
Equations (23) and (24) together make up tbe "competitivity" as-
sumption in Leiand [1973, p. 16j and Radner. In an economy where
(22)-(24) hold, it is clear from (19) tbat eacb consumer, with 0ij > 0,
prefers that the ; th firm maximize net market value q* • aj — yf, since
the only effect tbe firm has on consumption opportunities is to cbange
the wealth of the consumer. Leiand and Radner call this "ex ante
unanimity." By tbis they mean that even if all consumers do not come
to the stockholders' meeting holding the portfolio that is optimal
(given tbat the firm produces y]), tbey will still be unanimous in
valuing any plan. In our interpretation, the initial owners of tbe firm
who bave the power to make their production decision legally binding
wil! al! be unanimous in tbeir desire to maximize net market value.
Further, tbere is unanimity for botb small and large changes in pro-
duction plans: All stockholders want their firm to maximize net
market value, computed using (23).
It is helpful to give a calculus proof of unanimity in the above
economy. By definition, any firm / has a unique output representation
in terms of composite commodities \ek\:
(25a) yf = E
1=1
Setting f = j in (25a), we see that
dyl ^(25b) dc 1=1 [ d c j
But if we s e t / = k in (25a) and use (25a) to evaluate (15), we get
dy? J K K I J \
(25c) - r " = H oijk L dktei = Y,\T. cijkciki\ei.
dc k=i 1=1 1=1 \k=\ I
Equations (25b) and (25c) give two representations of the vector
dyj/dc. Since this vector is feasible for a firm, it has a unique repre-
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sentation in terms of the basis vectors {e/}/. Hence
(25d) J = Y, ctjkakt.
dc h=i
But by (23) dpj/dc = q • (diXj/dc) = YiQiidc\ji/dc), wbere the first
equality uses tbe assumption that the firm takes the prices of char-










From (26) we see that spanning and competitivity imply that dU'/dc
= X,Oij{d(pj - yf)ldc). Thus, Leiand and Radner use competitivity
to sbow that irrespective of whether Oij = S^j, all stockholders prefer
net-value maximization. By assuming no trade Stiglitz and Ekern-
Wilson had no need to examine the sign of the wealth effect, and thus
no need to assume competitivity to study dpj/dc. Under spanning plus
competitivity, an increase in the firm's net market value always ex-
pands the consumption opportunities of its sbarebolders as can be
seen from (19).
From the above discussion, it is clear that there are two kinds of
results in tbe literature. The first set of results assumes spanning and
competitivity and shows that all shareholders want their firm to
net-value maximize. The second set of results a.ssumes some kind of
"no trade" and only spanning, and proves unanimity. In this case,
shareholders need not be unanimous about net-value maximization.
In the next .section we shall show tbat none of tbe "no trade" as-
sumptions make sense in a multiperiod context, and argue tbat
spanning alone is not sufficient to prove unanimity, but spanning and
competitivity are sufficient for proving unanimity.
IV. T H E MULTIPERIOD ECONOMY
In the last section we assumed that there was only one trading
period in order to survey tbe literature on unanimity. In this section
we return to tbe model of Section II where consumers are permitted
to trade in period 1. In equation (8) of Section II, we see that consumer
i's preference for a change in theyth firm's production decision dc.
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depends upon three terms. The first term is the period 0 wealth effect,
the second term is tbe period 1 wealtb effect, and tbe third term is the
consumption effect (tbe fourth term is the wealth effect due to tbe
cost of tbe new inputs). We can use the spanning assumption (15),
along with tbe first-order conditions (5) and (6) to write (8) as
du: .
dc
Y KiOO{t))^^+ . KtiO,j-Oij{t))^^+ Y, KtO.jit) Y
(=1 dc 1=1 k=i
f
where we bave used the implicit competitivity assumption
= 0 = dpk{t)/dc for k ^ j . Note that Cxjk does not depend upon the
signal ( because none of the firms" output vectors depends upon t. In
tbis model firms must fix their production plans in period (); no firm
produces any output until period 2. Consumers may trade in period
1 based upon new information. From (27) it is clear that tbere will be
unanimity if Bij = 0ij = Oijit). However, even if the Ekern-Wilson-
Leland assumption is made that Oij = 0,j, there will not, in general,
be unanimity when ^^ j) 7^ Oij{t).
There is one situation in which there will be unanimity and tbat
is when competitivity is assumed. Tbat is, we can construct the
Arrow-Debreu economy for characteristics as of period 1. Consider
tbe equilibrium for characteristics, when firms make production de-
cisions that span Z. At date 1, some signal / is observed and shares are
traded among consumers. As we sbowed in the last section, the trading
of sbares can be thought of as the trading of cbaracteristics. Let q, be
the price vector at date 1, signal t for the vector of characteristics (ei,
e2, eK),le.,qt e R+.
Wben a consumer buys shares in period 0, he is buying period 1
risk. Let A = (ai, a2, • • •, <vj) be the matrix of composite commodities
that firms have chosen to produce in period 2. That is, for eacb firm
j , yj = Yk(''^jkek- We now define tbe space of risky incomes that tbe
consumer will face in bolding securities from period 0 to period 1. Let
Q - \Qt\h] he given, and define
(28) = Pt
for some \ai\'L] e
As q, • aj is the period 1, signal t price of firm ;, pt is tbe consumer's
income from securities in period 1, if bis initial portfolio is {(YJI \pt \i
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is tbe "signal distribution" of income received in period 1.
We now show that spanning implies that no firm can affect PgiA)
when it changes its output plan:
PROPOSITION. Suppose tbat
p e Pq(A), aj,= Y. cvjbahi,
k=l
for some real number s ajk, and A' - (rti, a2,...,«},..., aj), then p
e P^{A').
Proof. We are given la/| e R'^ such that
J
Pt=Y '^iQt • ai +
l^J
and we must find t«'/| e R'^ such that
J ,
Pt = Y ot'iqt • ai +
The latter will be true when a) = ai - a'jciji for / ?^  ; and a) = aj -r
ajj, as can be verified by direct calculation.
Q.E.D.
Let {.v} i be the firm output vectors tbat are assumed to span Z.
Let \a'j\ be the cbaracteristics produced (y* = E-t«jV/()- Let A* = (a\,
a*j, . . . , a'j). Clearly
(29) P^{A)GP^{A*) foralM.
Let {cm(i?)!if=i be a basis for P^{A*), and consider the following
Arrow-Debreu economy. Define l:c[**, xj', (/jj, /3*|, \y'j. yf, «*), {r*, q*\
to be an overall equilibrium in characteristics if r* e R+, q* = \q'i\f,
q't € Ri, and
Consumer i chooses
(30) xT € R+, x]' € Rl },^ -y) e R^. ^] e
to maximize Viixf, xj, /?,) subject to








to maximize r* • jj - y'j, subject to




Y ^'k(t) = Y ,
In (30) the consumer purchases quantities 10;^! of the period 1
characteristics \c*^\ at prices {r'^}, and he also purchases fi.it) units
of the period 2 cbaracteristics at prices q*. Note that we have described
tbe consumer as if he faces two budget constraints. Rather than di-
rectly purchasing his date 1 and date 2 consumption at time 0, he
purchases enough securities so that he insures himself against date
1 price changes. The equilibrium would be unchanged if we gave tbe
consumer a single budget constraint and allowed him to purchase
directly all future consumption at time 0. In (31) the;th firm produces
a quantity \ajk \ of period 2 characteristics \ejk j , but in so doing also
produces \yjm\ units oftbe period one cbaracteristics {c^j.'' Note that
Q*t = (Q*n, Q'-I, • • • . Q'K) is tbe price vector for characteristics at date
1 given that the information state is t. In (32) we have required that
markets for goods and characteristics clear at each date and signal.
Using tbe same argument given in the last section, tbe econ()my de-
5. Note tbat tbe constraint q', • aj = Y.myjmc'mi states tbat tbe dale 1, state (
market value of tbe bundle of tbe date 2, state .s characteristics that firm; produces
(wbich is given hyq'-aj) must equal the sum of tbe date 1, state ( incomes it promised
to produce as of time zero. That is, tbere are two equivalent ways of accounting for the
firm at date 1, state (. On tbe one band, the firm is a claim to date 2 state .s income. On
the other band, as of lime 0 the firm was a tollection of cbaracteristics l7jmlm-!- wbich
represents tbe random market value tbat the firm may bave at time 1 (because ( is
random). (Note that7,m is tbe number of units of cbaracteristic m that a holder of the
firm gets at date 1. Characleristic m is the vector jc^,!, of date 1 income.) Tbua, the
total payoff of the firm is^Em7jmtm, at dale l,st,ate(. It is as if tbe firm is liquidated
at that date for HmT/in'mf when t is the slate of nature.
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fined by (30)-(32) is equivalent to the stock market economy wben
spanning (equation (22)) holds and the prices in the stock market are
given by
(33) p' = r* . y], p-{t) = q', • a) = T. yU',,,.
m
This follows immediately from the fact that by buying tbe appropriate
portfolio of period 0 shares of firms, a consumer can purchase the same
period 1 cbaracteristics at tbe same prices in the stock market econ-
omy as he was purchasing in the characteristics economy. A similar
statement holds for the period 2 cbaracteristics.
If we make tbe competitivity assumption that each firm takes




then we can prove an ex ante unanimity theorem. From (30) it is clear
that tbe ;th firm should choose 7 ,^ yf to maximize the firm's net
market value: r*yj - yf. Increasing the net market value unam-
biguously increases the consumer's consumption opportunities.
Further, by the lemma tbere is no change in the space of feasible
characteristics.
This can also be seen from (27), when we use the Arrow-Debreu
prices of cbaracteristics forpJ. That is, by (33) and (34) (i.e., compe-
titivity), dp'{t)/dc = q]{da]Idc). Using (25) and (33), we have




If the Stiglitz [1970], Ekern-Wilson [1974], and Leiand [1974]
assumption of initial portfolio equilibrium is made, Oij = Oij, then (35)
implies unanimity, though not necessarily in the direction of value
maximization. It should be clear that in the multiperiod context we
are considering it was necessary to assume competitivity as well as
spanning to get this unanimity result. In tbe one-period model
spanning alone is enough. We used competitivity to combine tbe pe-
riod 1 wealth effect (which represents capital gains and losses due to
new information) with the period 2 consumption effect. Witbout tbe
competitivity assumption the second term on tbe rigbt-hand side of
(27), which gives tbe period 1 wealth effects, will have different signs
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for different individuals. This is because different individuals have
different tastes for a change in the distribution of their income across
signals t. That is, looking at (27), if dpjit)/dc > 0, then shareholders
who are net buyers of shares at state t(Oij(t) > 0,j) will he suffering
losses, while shareholders who are sellers are realizing more capital
gains. The competitivity assumption allows us to connect the capital
losses some consumers are realizing in date 1, event /, with the in-
creased consumption benefits they will derive at date 2. In particular,
competitivity permits us to derive that dp]{t)ldc = Eft">fePUO; see
the discussion just hefore equation (35). We need competitivity to
predict the change in the price of the bundle of characteristics pro-
duced by the firm (i.e., p>(t)). which is caused hy a change in the
composition of the bundle. The competitivity assumption is that ihe
prices of characteristics are not affected when a given firm changes
its production plan.
However, because we have assumed competitivity in the pro-
duction of period 1 characteristics, there is unanimity even if Oij ^
(>ij. To see this, use (33) and (34) to get dp]/dc = r* • (dy'j/dc). Using
an argument similar to the one used in deriving (25d), we can use (15),
(25d), the fact that qra' = J^^ y'jmc'm, and \c',,\ as a hasis to show that*~*
dy'j/dc = T.kOijkyl- Thus, using (33), dp'/dc = Y.kO(jkp'k. Substi-
tuting this into (35) yields
dy ^'^^' dc
Hence if competitivity and spanning are assumed, then all initial
shareholders unanimously desire to maximize net market value, while
spanning alone is not, in general, sufficient for unanimity if there is
trade in period 0 of period 1.
6. Note that (31) implies that
bui from (25d)
• d a ' « • n * B * • •
(Bl q, —7-'- = q, Y. ";A"*- = H «>*?(«* = E «> T. ykm<'m,.
dc k k km
where the last equality follows from (31). Rearranging summation sign.s. (B) be-
comes
(C) q.-^=
But since Ic^l Is a basis, (A) arid (C) imply that
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V. SPANNING AND THE CHOICE OF A DEBT-EQUITY RATIO
We now return to the one trading period model of Section III.
We suppose that the production plan yj = iyj, y'f) has heen chosen,
and the firm must decide how to finance y}'. Let Dj be the period 0
value of the deht issued hy firm ; . Let 1 - a he the fraction of the firm
that the initial shareholders sell to raise capital (i.e., new equity).
Then
(37) yJ^Dj + (1 -a)pj.
Let BJ be the principal plus the interest which the firm promises that
hondholders will receive in period 2. Let h,j be the fraction of firm>'s
debt held hy consumer /. Then (1) and (3) are replaced by
(38) xfis) = Y. (^ij maxiO, yf is) - Bj) + Y. bij min(By, yf{s))
j J
and
(39) xf + Z Pjf^u + L Dibu < y hiPi - .V? + Di) + xf.5
respectively. In (38) the consumer's period 2 consumption comes from
nondefaulted debt payments ^ nd claims to residual output. In (39)
an initial shareholder owns a6ij percent of the firm, which is worth
aOijPj = B,j(pj - yf + DJ) hy (37).
We assume no trade in period 1, so the consumer maximizes
Uiixf, x}, xf) suhject to (38) and (39) with respect to xf, 8^, and 6,7.
Denote the maximized utility by L/;(By). LetBiBj) = |,s|v7(s) < Bj\
and NBiBj) = \s\yjis) > Bj\ be the sets of states under which bank-
ruptcy and no bankruptcy, respectively, occur. We are interested in
a change in the debt-equity ratio keeping the production plan yj
constant. We can calculate dt/J(Bj)/(iBj atB^ such that >-;(«) ^ Bj
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The Modigliani-Miller Theorem gives conditions under which
a change in the deht-equity ratio leaves the value of the firm un-
changed. Explicit in their theory is the idea that since managers desire
to maximize net market value, they should he indifferent as to the
debt-equity ratio. However, the managers will be indifferent only if
the shareholders are indifferent. Hence, the appropriate theorem
should he that all shareholders are indifferent ahout the debt-equity
ratio. As can be seen from (40), dVj/dBj = 0 is not equivalent to
dU'/dBj = 0. There is one important and well-known situation where
the two are equivalent, that is when (>ij = 6,;. This occurs if there is
portfolio separation such that all consumers desire to hold the same
mutual fund of all risky assets (e.g., when all consumers homoge-
neously believe that returns on all securities are multivariate normal
and there is a risk-free asset) i.e., hold all risky assets in the same
proportion.
We feel that the point ofthe Modigliani-Miller Theorem is that
the deht-equity ratio is indeterminate because ail shareholders are
unanimously indifferent hetween choices of Bj. For this to he true,
it is necessary that dU]ldBj = 0, where it is well defined. As can he
seen from (40), this will not he true in general. One situation in which
it is true is when there is no trade, i.e., dij = dij, and strong portfolio
separation, i.e., Ojj = bij. But this will not generalize to a multiperiod
model just as ex post unanimity does not generalize.
It might he thought that a spanning argument will lead to una-
nimity in the ahove context. It does lead to unanimity, hut it also
implies that there exist complete markets." To see this, let Bjis) =
min(Bj, y'f(s)), the risky payout stream of a bond. Spanning means
that no single firm can issue a security that is not in the space spanned
by existing securities. Let L c R^ be the linear suhspace spanned hy
existing securities. Thus, if t Wi\" is a basis for L, then for any B; there
exist real numbers \aiiBj)\i such that
for all s e S.
We assume that there exists a firm; such that for each s. s'^ e S,
yf(s) ?^  y;(s') and y;(s)>0 for alls 6 S. We now prove that if Bj can
be spanned by existing securities for any face value Bj, then L = /?''",
i.e., markets are complete.
7. Milne 11975, p. 177] proves the result that spanning of all of debt and equity
returns hy existing securities implies unanimity. He does not show that such spanning
also implies tbat ibere is a complete set of markets, which is wbal we show below.
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Letyi = mint3'y(s)|.s € S} and define for ^ = 2,3,,.. ,n,yk = min
\y'fii^)\yfis) >yk-h ands e Si:thenO<yi <y2 < • • • <y,M wheren
is the numher of states in S. Let By denote the bond that promises
to pay v/,, i.e.,Bjis) = min(yj(s),y/;).Letfirm; issue bond B)'"^; this
bond has a payout stream that looks like iy\,y2,. • • ,yn-i,y,,_i). Note
that the payout stream of yf looks like (yi, y2, • • • , yn-i, yn)- Since
yf has the same payout stream as a bond with face value y,, and since
the payout streams of all bonds can be achieved using existing secu-
rities, the payout stream of yJ - B^^' = (0, 0, . . . , 0, y^) can he
achieved using existing securities. Now consider the payout stream
of the bond with face value yn_2,B]'"- = (yi,y2, • • • .yn-2. yJt-•2•y«-2)•
By assumption thepayoutstreamof B""' — By"^ = (0,0,. . . ,O,yn-i
~ yn-2, yri-i — yn-2) can be achieved using existing securities.
Comhining this with the fact that (0,0,.. . , 0, y«) is achievable implies
that (0,0,. . . ,0, y^-i -yn-2,0) is achievable.
Continuing the ahove argument by successively creating bonds
with face valuey^-:j, yn-4, • • • , yi. we are ahle to generate n securities
each of which pays a nonzero amount in exactly one state, and this
state is different for the different securities. Thus, there must he a
complete set of markets. (In the above proof the assumption that yi
> 0 could be replaced with the assumption that there is some firm with
a positiveoutputin the state for which y;(,s-) = 0. If we make the as-
sumptions that (a) bonds can be issued on arbitrary portfolios of
securities, (h) for each state s there is some firm i for which yfis) >
0, and (c) for any s, ,s' there exists a firm,/ such yfis) ^ yfis'), then
we can use the results of Ross [1976] to show that markets must he
complete.)
Thus, spanning implies complete markets, and since it is well-
known that with complete markets the Modigliani Miller Theorem
is true, dU'/dBj = 0. Thus, under the assumption of spanning, com-
plete markets is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Modi-
gliani Miller Theorem to he true.^ However, this assumption is very
strong and leads to the implication that value maximization is una-
8. Kama and MiUer [ 1972, pp. 147-64] wisely emphasized tbe role of loan collateral
as a method of proving the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, when firms can go bankrupt.
Tbey correctly argue that if borrowing can be collateralized by shares ol" firms, then
any consumer can reproduce ibe returns stream of the firm's rishy del)t and equity.
An even stronger statement can be made, namely that markets must be complete if
these types of .secured loans are possible. This is because any consumer can create the
risky bond B^ described in the text above, by simply promising to pay back Vj.. and
securing the loan only witb shares in firm j . The relevance of their view depends upon
wbetber it is really true that consumers can create securities as easily as corporatii»n.s.
In particular, if I secure my loan with shares ol firm;, how dues the lender know tbat
I have not already secured another loan by assigning the rights to the same shares? It
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nimously preferred, as we showed previously.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to show that most ofthe unanimity theorems
in the literature on spanning make the assumption that there is no
trade during the time hetween the realization of firm's output and the
putting of inputs in place. That is, simple spanning theory concerns
firms that are not traded on the large stock exchanges of most
countries. Stocks traded on these exchanges have a large trading
volume everyday hecause consumers get new information about the
probability distribution of firm output (i.e., dividends). We have
shown that in such an economy consumers will in general disagree
ahout the production plan that their firm should use. This disagree-
ment arises hecause different stockholders anticipate different capital
gains and losses as new information reaches the market concerning
firm output.
We then showed that a unanimity theorem could he proved in
a multiperiod context if the assumption of competitivity is made in
addition to the assumption of spanning. That is, the output of a firm
can he written as if it is a composite commodity composed of various
units of hasis vectors, called characteristics. We showed that una-
nimity follows from the assumption that the firm takes the prices of
characteristics to he unaffected hy its production decision. This is a
generalization of the assumption made in Diamond [1967]. Though
this may seem like a minor additional assumption, it leads to a very
strong implication that spanning above does not imply. That is, if
there is spanning and competitivity. then stockholders unanimously
desire the firm to maximize net market value.
It is the implication of value maximization that leads us to think
that the spanning-competitivity theory may he incomplete. There
is one class of firms where it is quite easily seen that net value is not
maximized. A closed-end mutual fund is a firm that purchases shares
can often be difficult and costly to determine whether an asset has some lien against
it. Evidence for this is obtained by noting the prevalence of title insurance in the market
for land and bouses. At the end of Section VI. we refer to further empirical evidence
against tbe conclusion that the debt-equity ratio is irrelevant.
Note that if assumptions about consumer preferences or assumptions about dis-
tribution of returns are made that are sufficient to prove portfolio separation, then
they are also sufficient to prove tbe Modigliani-Miller Theorem under an appropriate
competitivity assumption. This is because portfolio separation implies that tbe economy
is equivalent to an Arrow-Debreu economy in ciimp()slte commodities of the type dis-
cussed in Sections III and IV. Note that these assumptions of course will also imply
that shareholders unanimously desire value maximization.
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of other firms on the stock market. Its only productive decision on a
given day is to purchase or sell shares of one firm for cash or shares
of other firms. The closed-end mutual fund is itself a corporation with
shares traded on the stock market. It is a fact that almost all closed-
end mutual funds sell at a suhstantial discount (see Sharpe and Sosin
[1975]). That is, the market value of the mutual fund's portfolio is
substantially higher than the market value of the mutual fund's own
shares. This means that there is a productive decision availahle to the
manager of the firm that would increase its value. The manager can
sell off the portfolio of stocks for cash and then distribute the cash to
the mutual fund shareholders. As this is not done, we conclude that
the shareholders of the mutual fund do not desire the fund to maxi-
mize market value.^
Most discussions of unanimity involve the choice of production
decisions. We argued that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is the result
that with no hankruptcy all shareholders are unanimously indifferent
among choices of the debt-equity ratio. We showed that if there is a
chance of bankruptcy, then shareholders need not be unanimously
indifferent as to the debt-equity ratio. Since the honds of the same
maturity for different firms have different yields, there must be some
chance that firms go bankrupt in the real world. It might he thought
that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem would still hold if there is
spanning for bonds. However, we show that spanning for bonds
implies that there is a complete set of markets. This, of course, em-
phasizes how strong the spanning assumption is. The Modigliani-
Miller Theorem is quite hard to test empirically hecause any debt-
equity ratio is consistent with it. However, if the total value of the
corporation changes as a consequence of the change in financial
structure, then this is strong evidence against the competitivity and
completeness of markets. Litzenberger and Sosin [1977] have analyzed
the consequences of changes in the financial structure of a type of
closed-end mutual fund called a "dual fund." They found strong
empirical evidence against the hypothesis that markets are complete.
They found changes in total value to be a consequence of changes in
the financial structure of those corporations.
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9. There is another possibility, namely that the shareholders would all be better
off if the closed-end fund liquidated or went open-end, but that the directors would
be worse off. Thus, if tbe directors act in their own interest, rather than in the share-
holders' interst, then discounted closed-end funds can persiHl. Grossman and Hart
11980] analyze tbis problem further and show that takeover bids cannot .successfully
be made at the discounted price because of a free rider problem.
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